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18 The Crumbling 
Pax-Africana 
A Political Analysis 
By Gilbert Keith Bluwey 
The abundance of rich natural and human 
resources aside, Africa today remains the 
sleeping giant of our time. Witness the 
continuing wave of big-power confronta-
tion in several parts of the continent - a 
confrontat ion that carri es ominous impli -
cations for the sovereignty, territorial in-
tegrity and econom ic well-being of the 
continent as a whole. This exposes the 
dup l icily and tortuousness of the moral 
pretentions of big-powers toward Africa. 
It a lso vindicates the fears expressed by 
the early nationalists against the spectre 
of neocolonialism in its very embryonic 
stages. 
The combined effects of widespread 
poverty in weak and dependent econo-
mies, and the complex web of internal 
contradictions in the African setting , has 
generated situations very receptive to the 
bait of big-power pretentions. From the 
Horn down to the Cape, and throughout 
the Soudan and the Zambezi regions, the 
post- independence condition of Afri ca 
reacts with the precision of a robot to the 
whims of big-power manipulations. 
The story of the second scramble for 
Africa is well-known. The grant ing of poli-
tical independence to ind ividual African 
states did not bring a cessation of the 
centuries-old master-servant relationship 
wi th the retiring co lonizers. Indeed, the 
event served not only to exhibit the vast 
economic potential and strategic impor-
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tance of Africa in the international chess-
game, but also to expose the helplessness 
of the African states against foreign de-
signs on their sovereignty. Moscow and 
Peking , along with their satellites from the 
East, made an early debut in the fray 
while Washington and the West set out to 
fortify and expand their already secure 
frontiers . 
The more perceptive ones among the 
African nationalists clearly understood 
the policy implications of the new phase 
-of big-power pretentions toward Africa 
and denounced it as neocolonialism. In 
the words of Ghana's pioneer nationalist 
Kwame Kkrumah , " ... Once a territory has 
become nominally independent, it is no 
longer possib le, as it was in the last cen-
tury, to reverse the process. Exist ing colo-
nies may linger on but no new colonies 
wi ll be created. In place of co lonia li sm as 
· the main instrument of imperialism, we 
have today neo-colonialism. The essence 
of neocolonialism is that the State which 
is subject to it is, in theory, independent 
and has al I the outward trappings of in-
ternational sovereignty. In reality , its eco-
nomic system and thus its pol itical policy 
is directed from outside." 
Neo-co lonial ism under this persuasion 
presents a threat to the sovereignty of the 
state, because it denies the people of the 
new state the freedom to evolve their 
own autonomous poli ti ca l and economic 
systems. 
Progressive African nationalists, in =-
action to the deliberately precipitant · -
drawal of French bureaucracy f -
Guinea in 1958, and the foreign-indu 
imbroglio in the Congo (June 190C 
stepped up the call for practical steps -
wrest Africa free of neocolonialistdes ig -
The seven Casab lanca bloc of states-
Ghana, the United Arab Republ ic, Gu inEE. 
Ma li , Libya, Morocco and Algeria- spe-
cifically ca lled for an immediate politiCG. 
union of all Africa committed to sociar 
reconstruction along with an African H i ~­
Command fo r the defense of the le · 
torial integrity of the continental unior-
government 
For various widely known and hotly de-
bated reasons, a larger grouping of 29 
African states, dominated by Nigeria anc 
Liberia, rejected the union idea as wel l as 
the creation of an African High Commanc 
and the introduction of a program for the 
socialist reconstruction of Afri can sociel) 
and economy. Instead , they called for 2 
gradual and functional approach towaro 
"the ultimate goal of political unif ication. 
Bitter inter-persona l acrimony and ide-
ological rift followed , keeping Africa di-
vided for three long years during which 
time the super powers fortif ied their hold-
ings on the cont inent The compromi se 
charter of unity and cooperation which 
emerged at the first fully representative 
conference of the newly formed Organiza-
tion of African Unity (OAU) in Addis Ababa 
May 23, 1963, proved a patch-work of 
;:;ontradictions. The OAU, which in intent 
::md purpose represents the co I lective wi 11 
:md power of Africa against the forces of 
eocolonialism has been endowed with 
::. structure too weak to meet its basic 
:::ommitment. Its governing principles are 
= so fraught with contradictions which 
TNV haunt the best intentions of its found-
~ s. 
The more serious structural defects in 
;;1e OAU were the absence of an executive 
3'.lvereign to control and direct develop-
-.ents on the continent, and the failure to 
::--eate an African High Command to 
='uard against pre-emptive assaults on 
-.ember nations. Openly suspicious of 
- progressive platform for an immediate 
::urrender of territorial sovereignty to a 
tinental government, Africa's leaders 
1963 created the OAU, a loose associ-
- - n of equal states with no determinate 
tral direction. An annual conference 
:= heads of state was chartered to review 
- vnts on the continent for the preceeding 
::ar and to agree on areas of cooperation 
:he ensuing year. Foreign ministers of 
-:ember states constituted a Council of 
isters, which would meet quarterly to 
? iew developments on the continent. A 
=.:llllmittee on Arbitration and Concilia-
was also formed to attempt peaceful 
lution of conflict situations among 
-smber states. By deliberate ly creating 
obvious vacancy at the command-post, 
the OAU sought a peace structure based 
upon the pure good faith of its members. 
That obvious omission, in time, became 
an intolerable burden on the self-restraint 
of member states with revolutionary incli-
nations who set out under various guises 
to subvert a peace structure which they 
helped fashion. 
"The seeds of the present 
day concept of national self-
determination were sowed 
in the turbulence and 
resistance that followed the 
18th century partitions of 
Poland, the American and 
French revolutions of the 
18th century and the 
declaration of the war aims 
of the Allied powers in 
World War I/' 
An important pretext for subverting the 
OAU's pax Africana was provided by the 
organization 's charter. Overwhelmed by a 
common desire to work for the speedy 
dismantling of the remaining enclaves of 
colonialism, the charter averred to the 
principles of national self-determination 
The obvious intent of that declaration was 
to provide an authentic moral basis upon 
which to rally world-wide support for the 
intended total assau It on the pol ic;ies of 
assimilation and apartheid which sti II held 
sway in Portuguese and South African 
colonial thinking. In other words, self-
determination within the context of the 
OAU would be acceptable only for terri-
tories as a whole and not for ethnic group-
ings. Such an interpretation would be in 
consonance with the OAU's act (noted 
earlier) of legitimizing the arbitrary and 
unnatural territorial boundaries be-
queathed to each of its members by the 
respective retiring colonial power. 
Indeed, self-determination has never 
been accorded universal application in 
any historical context. The seeds of the 
present-day concept of national self-
determination were sowed in the turbu-
lence and resistance that followed the 18th 
century partitions of Poland, the American 
and French revolutions of the 18th cen-
tury and the declaration of the war aims 
of the Al lied powers in World War I. Alfred 
Cobban , in a highly instructive discussion 
of the subject, observed that although the 
Al lied Powers, as represented by Presi-
dent Woodrow Wilson of the United States, 
gave the broadest and the most liberal 
exposition to the concept , they meant it to 
have only a limited application . 
Cobban's view was that the Wilsonian 
concept of national self-determination re-
ferred exc lusively to those areas of Europe 
and Asia which were under the sovereign 
jurisdiction of the defeated powers of 
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20 World War I. The concept was given fur-
ther force and form by the third article of 
the Atlantic charter (1941) and thereafter 
became the ideologica l weapon wh ich 
liberation movements throughout the 
world wielded to wrest themselves free of 
foreign political dominat ion. In recent 
times, a Secretary General of the United 
Nations Organization (U Thant) asserted 
.. as far as the question of secession of 
a particular section of a member state 
is concerned, the United Nation 's atti-
tude is unequivocal. As an international 
organization , the UNO. has never ac-
cepted and does not accept, and I do 
not believe it will ever accept the 
principle of secession of a part of its 
member-state." 
In addition , the 15th Session of the UN 
General Assembly (1963) adopted the 
following resolution , 
"Any attempt aimed at the partial or 
total disruption of the national unity 
and territorial integrity of a country is 
incompatible with the purposes and 
principles of the Charter of the United 
Nations Organization." 
Pious declarations, however, are never 
enough to restrain the ambitions of revo-
lutionary leaders. Thus, in the absence of 
potential deterrence, member states of 
the OAU, as indeed every other ambitious 
state in the international system, nurse 
territori al ambitions and often attempt 
their implementation. 
It must be remembered also that the 
prospect of reuniting kingdoms and ethn ic 
groups arbitrarily held apart by colonial 
rule provided much of the spark to nation-
alism. To confound such a cherished ex-
pectation , even when the guards have 
been changed , means to perpetuate a 
fundamental mistake of colonialism. Re-
sistance is unlikely to abate merely be-
cause the internal colonizer has a skin 
co lor identical to those of the co lonized It 
appears that the good faith of the founding 
fathers in the self-restraint of generations 
of African leaders has been misplaced. 
The progressive forces lost also on 
their demand for an African High Com-
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mand to guard against territoria l en-
croachments. Again, events subsequent 
to the rejection of the- pro posa l for High 
Command clearly vind icate the progres-
sive forces and negate the fears ex-
pressed by the reactionaries. 
The place of military might in the power 
relations among states cannot be over-
emphasized. As a rul e, the level of a 
state's military preparedness is a meas-
ure of its actua l power. Credible deter-
rance, therefore, requires man ifest fight-
ing power. There is little doubt that the 
white minority and Ian Smith of Rhodesia 
would have capi tulated to an Afri can High 
Command. The recent series of military 
promanades deep into Angolan and Mo-
zambiquean territories by South African 
troops , and into Zambia by Rhodesian 
forces , would not have been contemplated 
in the face of an African High Command. 
The embarrassing situation to Africa cre-
ated by the perpetual inability of the fight-
ing forces of Zaire to expel marauding 
bands of mercenary fighters from the 
strategic province of Shaba would have 
been offset by an African High Command. 
Also the existance of an African High 
Command would have helped ease ten-
sion among nations with trad itional boun-
dary disputes. In short, an African High 
Command would have offered the deter-
rance necessary to keep fore ign forces 
out of the continent and also restrain 
the ambitions of restive leaders on the 
continent. 
Wh ile the rejection of the idea of an 
African High Command did not mean 
that the statesmen were unaware of po-
tential threats to the sovereignty of indi-
vidual African states, they nevertheless 
saw those threats emanating from their 
neighbors. Thus, the conservative African 
leaders opted for various types of de-
fence de entete with foreign powers -
usually with the retiring colonial power. 
That option , unwittingly legi timatized 
continued fore ign mi litary presence and 
vi rtually reserved to France and Britain 
the right to intervene with troops to main-
tain the status quo. 
The foregoing backdrop should offer a 
basis for analyzing recent waves of er._ 
military intervention in Africa. In b~ -
terms, two types of conf lict situati 
plague the continent today. There a:= 
Conflict situations centeri ng around 
der disputes, and the principle of sc--
determination between groups of in = 
pendent African states. These c_ = 
represented by the conflict in the Hom -
Africa, the dispute over the Spanish -
hara and the series of border squabb = 
and ski rmishes in West and Central Afri 
In none of these situations has either = 
OAU or any of the parties in conflict bee--
able to pursue stated goa ls without .= 
benefi t of foreign assistance. The 0 • _ 
never articulated a definitive position -
these confl ict situat ions. Diplomatics .._-
port and alliance tend to change overni -
and without regard to principles. Forei_ 
powers, on the other hand, find the g --
running business attendant upon su -
conflict situations extreme ly lucrative af'= 
gleefully remain involved. 
" ... the unconditional 
surrender of the racist 
regimes - at least in 
Zimbabwe and Namibia-
would likely come as a 
result of continued armed 
struggle." 
The confl ict situations in Southern Africa 
-Zimbabwe, Namibia and Azania col-
lective ly-assume a different character. 
In those enclaves, progressive liberat ion 
forces who are allied with the socialist 
camp are p itted against reactionary and 
racist regimes. 
Western diplomatic strategists have so 
far reacted by offering to mediate a 
sett lement of each conf lict situation 
through peace plans worked out in places 
like Wash ington and London. In any event, 
the uncond itional surrender of the rac ist 
regimes-at least in Zimbabwe and Na-
mib ia- would likely come as a result of 
conti nued armed struggle. In the case of 
czania, it is difficult to anticipate the in-
- itable turn of events there once Zim-
33.bwe and Namibia capitulate to na-
- nalist forces. Possibly, a fencemending 
:JOlicy by the foe could go a long way to 
"BStrict the conflict with in the bounds of 
=- i lized accommodation. 
. The raging plague of Africa requires a 
roug h purification of the social envi-
ment in order to provide a lasting cu re . 
ical ly, the right answers sti 11 I ie in the 
: d dreams: The formation of a continenta l 
:lion government and a military High 
....ommand. 
If a continental government offers the 
.:est hope for finding lasting solutions to 
- 7ica's woes and problems, its attain-
-en! seems a fairly remote possibility. 
....ertain options become imperatives in 
-.e interim. In the first place, the nations 
fr ica should strive for economic self-
iciency at least within regional group-
- s. This would require positive steps 
- at would give meaning to the widely 
- dered theories of self-reliance and 
=.__,1eti onal cooperation within regional 
nomic unions. In this regard , a new 
-eaning must be given to the concept of 
-- elopment which should now be seen 
~ he attempt to provide for the material 
-ee<:Js of a people through the maximum 
- ization of the resources of their own 
ironment 
Similary, the level of development of 
- mcular African societies should cease 
oe measured by the volume and so-
-:,-- tication of the imports which its 
- pie use. Development within the Afri-
- - context should reflect the extent to 
- ich the good I ife is supported through 
-c:o utilization of resources available in 
-a African environment It is a false hope 
- expect to make a distinctively African 
ribution to wor ld civilization by ma-
-::: lating non-African artifacts. In other 
_ ds, the existing appendage economic 
_=ems should give way to national econ-
-es which would ensure that the mate-
- needs of the African people are met 
::.:.rgh African resources. Widespread 
_ _endence upon authentic African reci-
pes, for example, would curtail imports 
and reduce or even eliminate national 
nutritional dependence on the generosity 
of foreign powers. 
The second and equally urgent need is 
for the African states to develop credible 
deterrence capabil ities. Such a program 
should include the formation of regional 
defense pacts, joint research into the de-
velopment of weapons technology and 
the total exclusion of non-African fighting 
personnel from every independent African 
state. 
" ... the patchwork of African 
states share identical 
national interests and 
therefore common national 
enemies." 
The nation-states of Africa, collective ly 
constitute a natural security community: 
The high rate of communication and con-
tact across national frontiers is unlikely to 
diminish in view of the strength of cross-
national ethnic links on the one hand , and 
the strength of the pan-Africanist fervor 
on the other hand. Besides, the relative 
absence of entrenched ideological rivalry 
among the African states and the universal 
nature of the problems and goals of the 
individual states reduces the likelihood 
of intractable conflict situations and holds 
up prospects for cooperation among Afri-
can states. 
Thus, although very often at odds with 
each other, the patchwork of African states 
share identica l national interests and 
therefore common national enemies. A 
tacit, and perhaps unwitting expression of 
the identity of interests among the African 
states, is the unbroken history of c lose 
diplomatic cooperation on a myriad of is-
sues of mutual interest since the forma-
tion of the OAU. But effective diplomacy 
is one that is supported by a credible de-
terence capability. 
It is imperative, therefore, that once they 
adopt common foreign policy goals, the 
African states should provide the military 
establishment necessary to support the 
pursuit of those goals. This means that the 
establishment of inter-state , then regional 
military groups should proceed along 
with the establishment of cultural and 
economic links among the states of the 
continent 
By pooling their military resources into 
large reg ional units, the African states 
would be in a position to effectively deter 
foreign mercenary adventurers from ma-
nipulating African issues to their own 
advantage. 
As a corollary to the establishment of at 
least regional mil itary forces , the develop-
ment of military sc ience, rooted in the 
African environment, shou Id be vigorously 
promoted. In other words , African wea-
pons and African fighting methods should 
progressively replace the existing total 
dependence on external aid so as to en-
sure meaningful deterrence capability . 
There is need also for the promotion of 
ideological communion throughout Africa, 
if only to ensure easy identification of the 
continent's common enemies and com-
mon friends. In other words, the same 
scrup les that ruffle the minds of the West-
ern free enterprise wor ld about Commu-
nist gains in Italy (since 1976) and Rus-
sian missile build-up in Cuba (1960-62) 
and which cause discomfiture in the Krem-
lin over growing liberalism in Czechoslo-
vakia, (1968-69) should arouse the con-
cern of African leaders when their 
neighbors make overtures to the common 
enemy. The instruction of th.e celebrated 
Edmund Burke of 18th century British po-
1 itical fame is that ". . whenever our 
neighbor's house is on fire, it cannot be 
amiss for the engines to play a little on our 
own." D 
Gilbert Bluwey, PhD . is an assistant professor with 
the Social Sciences Department at Howard University. 
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